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Abstract
A debate concerning the nature of moral thinking in
traditional societies has long dominated the scholarship of ethical
thinkers and social anthropologists alike.  Western scholars and
intellectuals had justified colonialism as a “civilizing mission” meant
to rescue African “savages” whose only mode of regulating conduct
was through religion and magical sanctions.  According to these
scholars, in traditional cultures, there are no behavioural patterns,
which can be properly referred to, as ‘moral’. The argument here
is that behavioural patterns of the purely secular kind, which exist
in more complex societies, were completely absent in traditional
African societies, such that relationships between individuals in
society only had a religious undertone.
Introduction
What was the nature of moral thinking in the traditional African soci-
ety before the Europeans arrived on the shores of the Black Continent in
the 15th century? Was there anything resembling a moral order or an ethi-
cal system in traditional Africa similar to what existed in Europe, Asia or
the Americas, at that period in the history of the world? Or was it the case,
as Thomas Hobbes and other imperial scholars were wont to argue, that
Africa had “no art, letters or social organization, but instead, only fear and
violent death”?1 The German philosopher, Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831),
was even more poignant than Hobbes in his devalorization of African
culture. Like most European scholars of the colonial era, Hegel wrote in
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support of “a physiological lobotomy of the African Negro” (to use a
phrase we have appropriated from Frantz Fanon) 2 by positing the follow-
ing argument:
Africa is an ahistoric continent even   though it has a geographical
location. The people live in a condition of mindlessness barbering
without laws and morality.3
Hegel and Hobbes were not alone in the vilification or denigration
of the black race. Most European scholars, dating back to the period of
slave trade, have had some slide thing or the other to say about the Ne-
groid race. Renowned thinkers such as J. J. Rousseau, David Hume and
Immanuel Kant all had uncomplimentary things to say about the black
person. It is either the black man has a “subcritical” or “prelogical” men-
tality; or as Rudyard Kipling would argue, he is “half devil and half child,”
and needs the anodyne of brutality or physical violence to make him truly
human! 4
Even the great Karl Marx, the illimitable revolutionist and bitter
enemy of bourgeois capitalism, when it came to the issue of European
domination of non-European territories, knuckled under the racial weight.
While acknowledging the monstrosity of European rule over colonized
peoples, Marx was however tepid and tendentious in his assessment of
the colonial situation. In his view, the brutality and violence meted out to
subjugated people could be exculpated on the grounds that it made pos-
sible a “fundamental revolution in the social state” of such people.5 But the
logic of this argument is obverted by the very fact that it is a non-sequitur.
It is like saying that the white settlers in Zimbabwe and South Africa were
justified in dispossessing the black majority of their farm lands because it
helped expose the natives to modern methods of farming! Or that Hitler
was right in eliminating millions of Jews because it helped liberate the Jews
from the haughtiness of racial superiority or exclusivism! To argue that
way is to be engaged in bad logic or mere intellectual shenaniganism.
Bigotry, hatred as well as racial prejudice are age-old problems
that devalue our world and make light all human achievements. In particu-
lar, the peculiar problem known as negrophobia (i.e., the dislike for Ne-
groes) has remained the black man’s burden all through the ages. And
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though it is now a clichéd issue to keep harping on the old argument that
colonialism is responsible for the woes of the African continent, it is how-
ever a big surprise to discover that by some twist of logic, those same
imperial scholars who provided the intellectual justification for colonial
domination are usually the ones celebrated as intellectual gurus in African
intellectual circles!
The issues adumbrated above have been of a general nature.
However, the paper has a specific focus, which is to examine the claim by
European anthropologists and colonial historians that Africa lacked an
ethical (or, moral) system before its contact with Western civilization! The
crucial issue in this discourse is to consider whether or not this claim is
true; and whether there are historical or ethnological evidence to back up
such a claim. We shall also consider whether this opinion put forward by
the colonial historians is not in fact a harebrained assertion by some arm-
chair scholars who lacked the basic knowledge of how traditional cultures
operated. But before we get into the discussion proper, we need to make
a few general remarks on the meaning of morality and some other related
concepts.
Morality and Cognate Concepts
Moral thinking is concerned with the issue of good conduct among
those who make up the human community. It is also concerned with the
creation of a humane social environment without which those who live in
society would hardly realize their goals and aspirations in life. It is for this
reason that people are constantly exhorted to lead morally emulous lives
because, as the argument goes, it is in living virtuously that human beings
can give meaning to their social life and existence. With particular refer-
ence to traditional African life, it was the opinion that a life of rectitude
helps build up society and guaranteed the individual a good place in the
preternatural or chthonic world. The logic of the belief in the existence of
an extra-terrestrial world notwithstanding, the important issue that bears
relevance to the present discussion is that the human community can only
function properly if it is built on a good moral foundation. But then, what
exactly do we have in mind when we talk about morals?  And in relation
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to African life, what was the nature of moral thinking among traditional
Africans in the pre-European African world? These are some of the issues
we shall address here. But first, we need to make the following explana-
tion.
 In philosophy, the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ are often taken to be
identical, and have as their cognate the word ‘morality’.  Etymologically,
‘moral’ is derived from the Latin word mores, meaning that which con-
cerns character, behaviour, or actions, considered or judged as being good
or evil, right or wrong, etc.  Broadly construed, however, morals refer to
the models and standards of conduct people adhere to.  As a concept, it
reflects the actual behaviour of members of big or small social groups as
well as what the members of these groups allow or prohibit themselves to
do.  Morals, says Kwasi Wiredu, “covers ethical rules proper as well as
customs and taboos.”6 In other words, morals taken as a whole bear on
the morality of a social community.  It entails human principles of right and
wrong, and deals with how people treat themselves in order to promote
mutual welfare, progress, creativity and meaning in a striving for what is
right over what is wrong, and what is good over what is bad.
In our day-to-day interactions as human beings, we expect people
to conduct themselves in a morally good way. Similarly, we also expect a
person to do that which is ethically propitious or good while avoiding that
which is evil. When, for instance, we judge the actions and characters of
people to be right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc., we have an
idea of the best way we think they can live. While we may define moral
behaviour as behaviour in accordance with the recommended patterns of
a community, the morality of a community on the other hand consists of
those ways of behaviour which each member of the community is taught,
bidden and encouraged to adopt by other members.
Having made the foregoing remarks, in the discussion that follows in
the paper, we shall dwell in particular, on the nature of moral or ethical
thinking in the traditional African society, that is, the African society before
Christianity, Islam or European colonization. But before proceeding in the
discussion proper, it is important to clarify the sense in which we are em-
ploying the term “society” in this essay.  In the present context, we are
using the word, “society” as a collective noun to represent the different
cultural groups that make up the African continent. In saying this, how-
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ever, we are aware that certain differences may exist in cultural emphasis
of the diverse groups that make up the African world. The other side of
the argument is to state that there are certain elements of culture, known
as cultural constants, or what John Bowker identifies as the “recurring
elements in human behaviour,” which arise from the fact that human beings
are all conceived and born in, broadly speaking, the same way.7 It is these
cultural constants or elements that establish the universal brotherhood and
kinship among all races. However, if as the argument goes, human beings
are the same or similar in certain respects, from whence came the prob-
lem of racial hate and prejudice among people? The answer to the ques-
tion is simply, bigotry and blind ignorance!
What is shown by the above is that the theory of cultural autarky
among the different African groups is neither supported by experience nor
historical evidence. This is perhaps what J. A. Omoyajowo tries to ex-
plain when he says that, “man everywhere is man;” and that the tribal
societies that flourished in primeval times were “relatively undifferentiated
and homogenous” in outlook.8 If this statement is accepted as a truism, it
therefore follows that we can confidently make some generalization about
the nature of African culture and belief system. Hence, in our discussion of
moral thinking in the primeval African world, we shall feel free to adopt
any given African culture of our choice to fecundate and to represent how
in traditional Africa as a whole, the people grappled with moral matters.
Our choice of a cultural guide in this regard will be the Igbo culture. But
this choice is not informed by a supposed superiority of Igbo culture over
other African cultures but for mere convenience, and because the author
is familiar with the Igbo culture itself and the language with which it is
conveyed. Put differently, traditional Igbo ethical thinking will merely be
an example or gauge for traditional African cultures as a whole.
Moral Thinking in Traditional  African Society
Africa is distinguished by its close-knit society.  Traditions, customs
and rules for regulating conduct and interpersonal relationships are varied
and diverse.  As with other societies of the world, in Africa, the rules are
not always obeyed nor expectations all the time fulfilled.  As a result, some
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sanctions are usually put in place to prevent social disorder and anarchy.
In every African community, an elaborate system of guides and sanctions
exist.  These range from legal sanctions, social customs to moral rules.  It
is often said that moral and ethical considerations in traditional African
societies are communitarian in nature, meaning that it is in submitting his or
herself to the will of the community that the individual finds social security
and peace.  J.O. Awolalu argues, for example, that the basic moral values
of which the elders are the guardians have to be maintained.  According to
Awolalu, it is the responsibility of the elders to see that all the social norms
and ethics relating to the well-being of the community are maintained.  The
argument here is that the elders “are aware that they owe their positions to
the author of these moral values and to the ancestors who are ever present
and ever watching to see that a high moral standard is maintained.”9
Based on this idea of communitarianism, some scholars have argued
that African traditional value systems lacked, in several respects, the char-
acteristic feature of a true moral system.  According to these scholars,
moral institutions in pre-literate societies were mere devices through which
men sought to establish a flourishing society.  They were at best studied in
functional terms, with the individual’s moral behaviour adjusted to meet
society’s need and expectations.  Among early anthropologists the view
was commonly held that in traditional cultures there were no such
behavioural patterns which can be properly referred to as ‘moral’.  The
claim here is that behavioural patterns of the purely secular kind which
exist in more complex societies are completely absent from traditional
societies, such that the relationship between individuals and, the individual
and all forms of social interactions were seen in religious perspectives
only.  To justify the foregoing assertions two types of arguments are usu-
ally proffered.  The first is the claim that a truly moral system must be
universalizable, and since African traditional codes of conduct discrimi-
nate between insiders and outsiders, they are said to have restricted ap-
plicability.  The second argument claims that a truly moral system is typi-
cally characterized by critical reflections, with reason as a crucial tool for
differentiating between right and wrong.  Traditional African value sys-
tems, it is argued, are not only dogmatic but have as their sources of
reference authority of one kind or another.10
A number of early social anthropologists and social scientists had
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also argued that life in traditional African societies was full of a superabun-
dance of the emotional as against the rational.  The worldview of such
societies, we are told, “is dominated by images which have their origins
almost solely in man’s uncharted sensations and are coloured more by
mystical awe than by the confidence of reason.”11 Long ago, Lucien Levy-
Bruhl held that the ‘primitives’ or the so-called savages had a prelogical
mentality, that their mind is incapable of rational, critical effort.  Levy-
Bruhl compares the Western and the so-called savage mind and argues
that the latter is:
not constrained above all else, as ours is, to avoid contradictions.
The same logical exigencies are not in its case always present.
What to our eyes is impossible or absurd, it sometimes will admit
without seeing any difficulty.12
Many Western scholars and social anthropologists are wont to ar-
gue that moral conduct in traditional African societies is bound by the
sanctions of dogma, religion and authority.  One such scholar, E.W. Smith
depicts African morality as ‘taboo morality’.  The African, he argues, is
taught to revere custom and resent change.  Smith lists three types of
sanctions, which according to him, explain African customs and behavioural
patterns.  These include religious, traditional and magical sanctions.  The
magical sanction, Smith says, is the oldest and strongest of the three, and
exercises the greatest influence on African behavioural patterns.13
The opinions above need reviewing, as there may not be scientific
evidence to support them.   With particular reference to Levy-Bruhl, we
need not bother refuting what he has to say since his were the views of an
armchair scholar which lacked any scientific or empirical support.  With
Smith, however, we have to concede that in Africa, customs are highly
revered and even cherished.  But this is also true of every human society
anywhere in the world- be it Europe, America or Asia.  In other words, it
is not only in Africa that culture is hallowed or cherished. What is true
about Africa in this regard is also true of every other society in the world.
But the other opinion which has it that Africans resent change is the one
that is rather bizarre and awry.  The truth of the matter is that Africans,
more than any other group or race, have proved to be highly receptive to
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change and new ideas. A few examples would help to lend weight to what
we have said here. Africans have not only accepted Christianity and Islam
which are foreign religions but even to the point of killing one another in a
bid to win adherents to their faiths. Nigeria is a good example where
religious violence and mayhem is a normal and common occurrence! And
almost all the religious wars fought in the country are between devotees to
Islam and Christianity. Africans have embraced Western education, de-
mocracy, and technology; they have even adopted foreign modes of dress-
ing and mannerisms. These can hardly be said to be the characteristics of
a people who are so enamored with their custom that they resent change.
By ‘traditional sanctions’ what the writers have in mind is that when
questioned regarding why he acts the way he does the African would
reply that his parents acted that way and bade him to act likewise.  M.J.
McVeigh avers, for example, that “by the mere fact that they are passed
on from generation to generation, customs tend to be hallowed by time.
They may have at one time rested on religious sanctions, but these have
been lost or forgotten; so that today the only answer given to the question
is that this is the way it has always been.”14 The argument that African
value codes have a restricted applicability needs some qualifications.  All
moral thinkers agree that moral codes or what are commonly known as
the fundamental principles of the moral law admit of exceptions.  We
could take as an example, the moral principle, “Thou shall not kill.”  Ordi-
narily, the killing of a human being is prohibited (under normal circum-
stances); but since circumstances are not always normal, situations may
arise where the killing of a human being becomes morally justified.  This
could be in a situation of self-defense (when the only way to save one’s
life from an unjust aggressor is to kill him), in a situation of war, or as an
act of capital punishment, etc.  These are all cases of restrictability in the
application of the moral principle which prohibits the killing of a human
being.  However, they are not peculiar to Africa but to all human societies
as a whole.
Admittedly though, a kind of discrimination exists between the way
an insider is treated and the way an outsider is treated in the so-called
traditional societies.  But this fact (if it is a fact) is not peculiar to African
societies but is universal to all human cultures and societies.  For example,
the European colonial authorities discriminated between their fellow Eu-
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ropeans and the citizens of the subjugated territories.  In the same way,
the fugitive occupationists in Australia and New England (now America)
discriminated between those of their own stock and the original owners of
these territories.  Therefore, the argument that African value systems lack
the characteristic feature of a true moral system simply because they are
said to discriminate between insiders and outsiders is non sequitur.  Be-
sides, the argument is untoward and lacks merit.  The truth of the matter is
that morality is a universal feature of all human societies; and to be moral
presupposes rationality. By simple or elementary logic or parity of rea-
soning, since Africans are rational beings, it follows as a matter of logic,
that their traditional value systems had a moral status.  To allude to a point
we have made already, morality entails human principles of right and wrong.
It deals with how humans treat themselves in order to promote mutual
welfare and self-fulfillment in society.  Keith Davis captures this point in a
picturesque manner when he argues to the effect that morality:
is reflected in the conscience of humankind confirmed by the ex-
perience of people in all ages.  It has to do with the consequences
of our acts to ourselves and to others.  It recognizes that life has
an overall purpose and accepts the inner integrity of each indi-
vidual.15
Moral Thinking  Among the Traditional Igbo
The Igbo form one of the three major ethnic nationalities in Nige-
ria. The other two are the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani. The Igbo had
many of its able-bodied youths exported to Europe and the Americas
through the Trans Saharan trade in slaves. Through British colonialism, the
people also had an early contact with Christianity and Western education.
However, our reference to Igbo past here is merely incidental and per-
functory, as this is not meant to be a treatise on Igbo history or colonial
experience. The Igbo experience with colonialism is well documented in
the literature that it needs no repeating in the present essay. Our choice of
the Igbo culture here is, as we said earlier, to serve as an example or
metaphor for our discussion on the nature of moral thinking in the tradi-
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tional African society.
A debate concerning the nature of moral thinking in traditional
societies has long dominated the scholarship of ethical thinkers and social
anthropologists alike.  And as we have indicated above, there are moral
thinkers who deny that traditional societies had value systems that could
truly be characterized as ‘moral’.  But as we have also pointed out al-
ready, this type of argument is vitiated by the fact that morality is a univer-
sal feature of all human societies.  Besides, the argument itself cannot be
sustained by evidence or by any rational proof.
Among the traditional Igbo, for example, the level of moral think-
ing was very high.  The Igbo language contains a variety of words to
express approval and disapproval, good and bad, pleasant and unpleas-
ant, and so on.  All embody moral connotations.  Take, for instance, the
words, ‘aru’ (pollution) and ‘nma’ (good); to commit ‘aru’ (ime aru, in
the Igbo language) is to do that which is evil while to do ‘nma’( ime nma,
also in Igbo) is to conduct oneself in a morally worthy manner.  A person
is described as ‘onye aru-rala’, literally ‘one who pollutes or abominates
the land’, if his or her ethical conduct is contrary to ethically approved
behaviour.  ‘Ajo mmadu’ is a phrase used to describe a bad man (or
woman), where the ‘ajo’ means bad, i.e., the opposite of good. Further-
more, when a thing or an act is spoken of in terms of ‘iru-ala’ (desecration
of the land), ‘ime-aru’ or ‘ime nso-ala’ (doing that which is abominable or
acting in pollution of the earth), all these are seen as morally bad actions.
Among the Igbo, ‘ala’ (that is, the land or earth) is believed to possess
some form of divine sanctity or sacrality such that one can either please or
offend the preternatural forces that indwell it.  The close link the Igbo have
to their land is largely due to the belief that it is the abode of the departed
ancestors.  Similarly, the fertility of the soil, the progress of human life as
well as the health of the animals is only assured as long as the earth is not
desecrated and the ancestors are duly honoured.
The Igbo word ‘nma’, as we have said earlier, conveys the idea
of goodness or the idea of acting in an ethically appropriate way. In all
things, the Igbo expect that individuals will act and conduct themselves in
morally good ways while avoiding that which is evil and obnoxious. In this
way, social harmony is ensured.  The good life for the Igbo is known as
‘ezi-ndu’ (i.e., the virtuous life), the life of rectitude and approbation.  But
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the question may be asked, what is it that makes some actions good and
others bad?  Put differently, what is the standard of judgment among the
traditional Igbo?  C.C. Okorocha answers that traditional Igbo moral
code is based on the concept of ‘omenala’ or social custom.  ‘Omenala’
derives from three Igbo words, namely, ‘ome’ (that which obtains); ‘na’
(in); ‘ala’ (land or society).  In the words of Okorocha, “the moral code of
Iboland commonly spoken of as ‘omenala’ defines the various aspects of
behaviour and social activities that are approved while at the same time
indicating those aspects that are prohibited.”16
Generally, in Africa, the norm of right or wrong is said to be social
custom.  As with most other societies of the world, in Africa, the good is
usually that which receives the community’s approval while the bad is that
which the community prohibits or frowns at.  While the good actions build
up society, the bad ones tear it down.  One is social, the other anti-social.
With the Igbo in particular, ‘omenala’ or social custom is the means by
which society enforces conformity to its rules.  ‘Omenala’ then, is the
means by which “the social ethos is measured, and the values of the soci-
ety... controlled from one generation to another and the processes of so-
cialization through which the education of the young ones are facilitated.”17
Traditional Igbo morality, like those of other African societies,
was communalistic in nature.  In communalistic societies, virtue and good-
ness are often seen as a means of realizing the social harmony of the
group.  They function to promote order,  peace and the feeling of camara-
derie among the individuals who make up society. Yet some writers claim
that such group-related morality detracts from the ‘essential’ nature of
morality.  Group-related morality, we are told, removes from the moral
life the joy of its inner motivation which, it is argued, results from choice,
personal decision and responsibility.  This is the type of argument, which
Paul Roubiczek makes in his book, Ethical Values in the Age of Sci-
ence. In the book, Roubiczek argues that “to subordinate the good to
another purpose, such as usefulness for society, falsifies its nature and thus
falsifies morality.”18
However, there is no good reason to suppose that Roubiczek’s opin-
ion is necessarily correct.  For as Gerhart Piers and M.B. Singer have
suggested, there is no scientifically demonstrable reason why in group-
related morality, “heavily influenced by the community’s rigorous enforce-
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ment mechanism including shame and taunting improvised songs, mem-
bers of such group could not develop inner remorse or guilt.”19 Some
elements in traditional Igbo cultural practice could be a helpful illustration
in this regard.  They will also help lend support to opinion expressed
above by Piers and Singer.  It was (and still is) the practice among the
Igbo that when a man and a woman were caught in any uncomely rela-
tionship like adultery, they were made to go round the village half naked,
with children singing taunting songs on their heels.  If any member of the
community committed a heinous crime or sacrilege, he was made to suffer
public shame or dishonour.  Such taunting songs, like the ones by the
children, apart from bringing the offenders to public opprobrium, were
also meant to deter others from committing the same type of offence in the
future.  Such immoral acts as adultery and incest were described as ‘nso
ala’ (i.e., pollutions against ‘Ala’, the earth goddess).  ‘Ala’, the goddess
of the land and custodian of Igbo morality, imposed numerous laws and
taboos which were meant to guide conduct between the individual and his
neighbours, the individual and the forces of nature and, the individual and
‘Ala’ itself.  In the words of A.E. Afigbo:
the transgression of any of these rules known as ‘omenala’ (con-
duct sanctioned by ‘Ala’) was promptly punished.  In this way
‘omenala’ came to mean the highest law.  It was distinguished
from, and superior to ‘iwu’ which is any enactment made by man,
the transgression of which would not involve offence to ‘Ala’ and
the ancestors, and did not imply moral lapse.  ‘Ala’ was the guard-
ian of Igbo morality.20
In concluding the discussion in this paper, what remains to be said is
that contrary to the trite opinion that traditional Africa lacked a moral
system, Africans are social beings like other peoples of the world; and as
social beings, Africans are not only rational but are also imbued with a
sense of rectitude and propriety. To backtrack on a point made earlier in
the paper, morality is basically concerned with society and with the rela-
tions between men and their fellow men.  It is also concerned with general
rules governing relations between men and the rules of society they ought
to adopt.  And as Thomas Hobbes himself would later argue, “the prov-
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ince of morality is limited to those qualities of mankind that concern their
living in peace and unity.”21 In other words, no society can subsist or
continue to flourish without a solid ethical or moral foundation. Societies
that encourage good ethical conduct are the ones that have the capacity to
survive whereas the ones that encourage moral laxity or rapaciousness
are likely to founder, as was the case with ancient Sparta.
As we bring this discussion to a culmination, there are two final re-
marks that should be made, and which bear a close relevance to what we
have said in the paper already. One is that good moral conduct redounds
or conduces to the good of society as a whole. The other is that among
Africans in particular, apart from the healthy social role which morality
promotes, the pursuance of moral rectitude is also seen as a precondition
for attaining a beneficent place in the ancestral mode of being. Generally,
Africans regard the ancestors as organic members of the community of
the living and as links between the living and the preternatural forces that
inhabit the unseen world. The ancestors wield tremendous power over
the living.  Among the Igbo, for example, they are seen as the custodians
of the social norms of the community, through whom “the moral code is
passed on to the living members of their lineage.”22
Perhaps this explains why Africans set much by on people living virtuously
in the society. Similarly, Africans believe in the transiliency of the human
existent from the mundane to the divine essence. And sure enough, the
belief in an after life of some sort, and the hope of attaining to the enviable
status of a departed ancestor could be for people an incentive to live
morally worthy lives in the community. The important thing here is not the
logic of the belief in an afterlife or of the existence of ancestral beings that
inhabit the after world but the fact that such beliefs served as an aid for
traditional Africans to live morally worthy lives in the human community.
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